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Preceding empirical evidence has shown the effect of most corporate governance mechanisms 
on CSR and environmental disclosure. However, there is scant empirical evidence based on 
examining the influence of liberal countries, developed market economies and board 
structures on environmental disclosure. Thus, this research aims at exploring how liberal and 
developed countries and board structures affect environmental reporting. We hypothesise that 
there is a linear and positive association between firms located in countries with liberal and 
developed market economies and environmental reporting. Moreover, we also hypothesise 
that one-tier board structures affect negatively environmental disclosure. Focusing on 13,100 
firms from 2005 to 2015 domiciled in 39 different countries, we find that firms located in 
liberal and developed economies are more likely to disclose environmental information, while 
one-tier boards have a negative effect on it.  
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There is a growing concern in society about the commitment of businesses toward 
environmental issues (Mårtensson and Westerberg, 2016). As a result, companies are more 
engaged with corporate sustainability reporting practices (Gray et al., 1995), tending 
particularly to disclose more social and environmental information to their stakeholders. 
According to Azzone et al. (1997), the environmental report shows the extent to which the 
company’s products impact on the environment, its engagement with stakeholders and the 
relevance of the strategic environmental management of the firm. Among the reasons why 
companies disclose environmental information, there are several. For Deegan and Samkin 
(2006), one of the reasons is to show the responsibility of the company in environmental 
issues toward the society and to respond to stakeholders’ expectations. For Vanhamme and 
Grobben (2009), the most important is to protect the reputation and identity of the company 
engaging with interested parties through what others have described as a form of moral 
discourse. Another reason for companies to disclose environmental information is to improve 
their image. 
Most of past research based on the environmental field has focused on analysing 
business characteristics affecting environmental disclosure such as size, leverage or 
profitability that affect environmental disclosure (Rizwan and Ali, 2013, Eleftheriadis and 
Anagnostopoulou, 2015). Other scholars have explored the impact of environmental reporting 
on corporate performance (Hassan and Romilly, in press) or the quality of environmental 
disclosure (Iatridis, 2013). However, other issues related to the institutional environment, the 
economic development and the geographic area have received less attention by researchers 
and, therefore, their effect on environmental reporting merits a deeper analysis. Thus, the aim 
of our research focuses on examining how countries located in liberal and developed market 
economies and board structures impact on environmental disclosure. 
Regarding a liberal market economy, it is placed within the framework of varieties of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which considers companies as the core of analysis and it 
is an appropriate framework to explore the differences among countries at a company level in 
environmental matters. In relation to developed countries, there is still a great controversy 
about their influence on environmental disclosure by companies in comparison to developing 
countries. In the case of board structures, there is also debate on whether the presence of a 
one-tier or two-tier board increases the environmental competences of the different directors 
in order to improve environmental disclosure by companies. 
	
	
According to above arguments, there are different theories underlying the disclosure of 
environmental information, particularly institutional and stakeholder theory. The institutional 
theory tries to explain why companies evolve and behave in a particular way (Hall, 1996). In 
this regard, Scott (1995) posits that institutions are management processes based on rules that 
transcend companies and characterise their social behaviour. In this context, institutions will 
help understand corporate environmental reporting not only as a voluntary discourse, but also 
as a requirement imposed by the business environment. On the other hand, stakeholder theory 
recognises that in addition to creditors and shareholders, there are other players who are 
interested in knowing the environmental performance of companies and, therefore, they 
demand information on the environmental impact of their activities. Thus, to the extent that 
companies recognise the legitimacy of their stakeholders, they tend to voluntarily report their 
environmental information to meet their requests (Deegan, 2002). 
This study contributes to prior literature focused on environmental disclosure in 
several ways. Firstly, this study is based on 39 countries, which allows us to analyse the 
importance of separating them between liberal and developed market economies and of 
exploring their impact on environmental reporting. Secondly, although past research mostly 
focuses on greenhouse gas emissions (Hassan and Romilly, in press), climate change 
(Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou, 2015) or carbon disclosure (Calza et al., 2017), this 
research also takes into account other environmental factors in the environmental disclosure 
measures such as renewable clean energy products, policy energy efficiency or environment 
management training, among others, which gives a comprehensive view of how businesses 
manage the disclosure of environmental issues in the countries analysed. Thirdly, we have 
tried to answer the following questions: a) What is the association between companies 
domiciled in countries operating in liberal market economies and environmental disclosure?, 
b) What is the relationship between firms domiciled in countries operating in developed 
market economies and environmental reporting? and c) What is the effect of board structures 
on environmental disclosure?. 
The results show that liberal and developed market economies have a positive impact 
on environmental disclosure, while board structure affects negatively. We argue that the 
country origin is a relevant factor in the disclosure of environmental information companies 
(Gray et al., 1995; Reverte, 2009). Moreover, board structure has a negative effect on 
environmental disclosure when there is a one-tier system, since this structure does not 
guarantee board independence and, therefore, it does not engage with stakeholders’ needs 
such as environmental disclosure.  
	
	
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical 
background and hypotheses. The third section describes the methodology of the study, the 
sample and the variables. The fourth section presents the findings of the study and, finally, the 
fifth section contains a summary of the findings, draws conclusions, and provides limitations 
and future lines of research.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
The existence of a unique theoretical framework to explain the determinants of 
corporate environmental disclosure is still difficult to achieve (Gray et al., 1995). Authors 
such as Cormier and Gordon (2001) argue that the association between the political, social 
and institutional context and environmental disclosure are theoretically supported by socio-
political theories. Among social-political theories, the institutional and stakeholder 
approaches are considered of the most relevant. Precisely, we focus on institutional and 
stakeholder theories to explore how liberal economies, developed market economies and 
board structures affect environmental reporting. These theories have also been used by Dögl 
and Behnam (2015) in the corporate environmental responsibility’s context. 
Institutional theory posits an explanation of why companies evolve and behave in a 
particular way (Hall, 1996). In this regard, Scott (1995) shows that institutions are steering 
processes focused on rules, which transcend companies and characterise their social 
behaviour. Institutional theory argues that companies operating in similar environments tend 
to adopt the same strategic behaviour and focus on the deeper aspects of social structures 
(DiMaggio and Powel, 1983, Claessens and Fan, 2002). According to this theory, the 
structures that include routines, norms, schemes and rules are established as authorized 
guidelines for social behaviour (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Institutional approach also 
supports the idea that companies respond to the pressures of their stakeholders (e.g., demand 
for environmental disclosure) by imitating the practices of leading companies in their industry 
with the aim of gaining legitimacy (Aerts et al., 2006). In this context, institutions help 
understand corporate environmental reporting not only as a voluntary discourse, but also as a 
requirement imposed by the corporate environment.  
 
This process is called isomorphism by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Isomorphism 
refers to a process in which a company behaves similarly to another company by adopting the 
characteristics of the other organization (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007). The structures of the 
companies are influenced by their social and institutional environment and, therefore, the 
	
	
companies that wish to survive use isomorphism by adapting to their external context (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991). This is due to the fact the companies operating under the same 
institutional environment are pressured to behave in a similar way, which leads companies to 
be homogeneous within a particular context and, accordingly, these companies will adopt, for 
example, the same model of environmental disclosure. In this regard, Brammer et al. (2012) 
consider that institutional theory will be an appropriate framework for understanding and 
explaining how and why environmental issues assume different forms in different countries. 
Stakeholder approach argues that companies should consider all stakeholders demands 
when environmental strategies are implemented because if stakeholders are disregarded, then, 
there is risk that they will withdraw their support to firms. Environmental disclosure is 
considered a relevant tool for mitigating stakeholders’ pressure regarding environmental 
matters when there are not environmental regulations (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Thus, to 
the extent that firms recognise the legitimacy of their stakeholders, they tend to voluntarily 
report on environmental aspects to meet their needs (Deegan, 2002).  
Stakeholders can be classified into two categories: external stakeholders, who are 
suppliers, creditors, agencies, customers, governments, among others; and internal 
stakeholders, who are managers, employees and shareholders (Mitroff, 1983; Ferrell et al., 
2009). The interaction between firms’ managers and stakeholders is reciprocal (Wernerfelt, 
1984) since stakeholders provide resources to firms, which allow them to survive, while that 
firms will satisfy stakeholders’ interests and demands. In this regard, Roberts (1992) 
documents that environmental disclosure is considered as a part of the dialogue between firms 
and their stakeholders. The latter are interested in knowing the environmental performance of 
firms and, therefore, they will demand firms information on the environmental impact of their 
activities.  
Drawing on institutional and stakeholder theories, we examine how countries located 




2.1. Liberal market economies  
According to Hall and Soskice (2001), the varieties of capitalism depend on the social 
agents and institutional contexts, which are result of political commitments, being the 
institutional theory the most widely used to analyse corporate environmental disclosure 
(Matten and Moon, 2008) in cross-country research. In this regard, Jackson and Apostolakou 
	
	
(2010) based their research on institutional theory in order to explore the association between 
the varieties of capitalism and the context of corporate social and environmental reporting.  
The varieties of capitalism are situated within the institutional theory, developed in the 
political economy to understand the institutional differences and similarities among the 
economies. According to the varieties of capitalism approach, firms are considered the core of 
the analysis, considering also what governments can and cannot achieve. Hence, this 
perspective is a suitable framework for examining the differences among countries at 
company level in environmental matters (Gjølberg, 2009, Hartmann and Uhlenbruck, 2015). 
The main emphasis of scholars in this field focuses on the distinctive nature of the 
national institutional contexts where companies operate, in aspects such as the legal system 
and government, the financing sources and the education systems. They postulate that there is 
a coordinated market economy (CME) when companies interact to solve problems oriented to 
stakeholders, while liberal market economies (LME) occur when the shareholders and 
creditors prevail in front of other stakeholders. According to Kang and Moon (2012), CME 
are characterised by strong state dominance and influenced by the interests of organizations 
such as employers' associations and unions, whereas LME countries are characterised by 
strong market dominance and a strong notion of property rights. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) also refer to LME and CME by indicating that LME is 
characterised by active capital markets, dispersed ownership, flexible labour market and weak 
cooperation link between businesses, in contrast to CME, which is characterised by capital 
markets with low activity, ownership concentration, rigid labour market, and strong inter-firm 
cooperation. According to the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, LME firms may 
adopt voluntarily policies and practices based on social and environmental issues (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2006) since the participation of stakeholders are not strongly institutionalised. 
Contrary to this, companies operating in CME may adopt many implicit forms of corporate 
social responsibility such as environmental issues, being stronger in the adoption of minimum 
standards of corporate social responsibility (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010).	 In line with 
above arguments, Hummel et al. (2017) find that in LME there is relatively less regulation on 
corporate social responsibility practices such as environmental disclosure, but firms are more 
engaged with the disclosure of social and environmental information, while CME countries 
have more environmental regulations, but the reporting of social and environmental issues is 
limited. It can, therefore, be assumed that companies located in liberal market economies are 
more likely to disclose corporate social responsibility information such as environmental 
	
	
matters than companies located in coordinated market economies. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms domiciled in countries with liberal market economies are 
positively associated with environmental reporting.  
 
2.2. Developed countries  
Developing countries in comparison to developed countries may not disclose 
environmental information since society in these countries is, in general, less strict in the 
demand of this information and are less informed. Additionally, as Tsang (1998) evidences, 
the increase in the level of CSR disclosure in developing countries such as Singapore is due to 
the presence of several big multinationals firms from developed countries operating in these 
developing countries. Past literature focused on developing countries shows a decrease in 
environmental reporting (De Villers et al., 2006) because the expectations over the time have 
changed (Lindblom, 1994). On the other hand, Yu et al. (in press) show that the disclosure of 
environmental information is high in countries where the level of economic development is 
high, due to higher levels of resources and greater awareness of social and environmental 
problems.  
In this respect, Dögl and Behnam (2015) argue that in a study carried out by the Press 
Freedom Index 2011/12, several differences are found in environmental matters between 
Germany or the USA as developed countries compared to other less developed countries such 
as India, which occupies a Rank of 131 with respect to Germany with the position 16 and 
USA 47. This can be due to the fact that in these developed countries, stakeholders’ firms are 
more sensitive to corporate environmental practices. 
Preceding empirical research (Gnyawali, 1996; Husted, 2005) also supports the view 
that economic development is a relevant driver for increasing environmental disclosure. In 
this regard, Gnyawali (1996) finds that rich societies tend to demand firms more social and 
environmentally responsible performance because people in these societies are better 
informed. Yu et al. (in press) also report that in countries with a high level of economic 
development, namely, developed countries, firms are more likely to disclose environmental 
information. These authors argue that their findings were expected because as other scholars 
evidence (Gnyawali, 1996; Husted, 2005), low economic development contributes to the 
environmental degradation. According to stakeholder perspective, in developed market 
economies it is more likely to disclose environmental information since this information is 
more relevant for stakeholders to make relevant decisions related to social and financial 
	
	
issues. Firms provide environmental and specific information, which is more sensible for 
stakeholders, but in addition, as Aldrugi and Abdo (2014) find, companies report 
environmental information because they have many other concerns, including reputation, 
legal requirements and public pressures. Thus, the hypothesis proposed is the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms domiciled in countries with developed market economies are 
positively associated with environmental reporting. 
 
2.3. Board Structure 
There are two prevalent board structures, one-tier board or unitary model, and two-tier 
board or dual model (supervisory and management board are separated). One-tier boards are 
composed by both executive and non-executive directors and CEO duality is possible. In 
contrast, two-tier boards are characterised by independent management and supervisory 
boards (Choudhur, 2017) and CEO duality cannot take place. Supervisory boards are 
composed by non-executive or outside directors, whose functions are based on advising and 
monitoring management behaviour. On the other hand, management boards are integrated by 
executive directors, whose activities are focused on managing daily firms. Thus, a two-tier 
board structure will be a better system than a one-tier board structure because all its board 
members are non-executive. This allows them to be more objective and more independent in 
monitoring and controlling the performance of executive managers.  
In one-tier board system, corporate boards are considered the highest governing body, 
whose main functions are the establishment of company’s policies and make important 
strategic decision, among other things. In this regard, in a one-tier board system, boards can 
be made up by both executive and non-executive members. Boards represent shareholders and 
their directors, mainly non-executive, will have to monitor behaviours, decisions and policies 
of management team, which have to be in line with shareholders and stakeholders’ 
expectations (Dunn and Sainty, 2009). However, the credibility, independence and objectivity 
of executive directors when monitoring managers may be challenged since they may be also 
part of the management team (Ahmad et al., 2017). Consequently, independent directors lose 
the ability to monitor managers’ behaviour and the decision making process because 
independent and executive directors share the same board (Block and Gerstner, 2016) and, 
accordingly, the latter might control and influence all decisions made by independent 
directors. Thus, in one-tier system it is more difficult to find ways for guaranteeing that a 
certain number of board members are independent and, thereby, it is more likely that 
members in one-tier board structures discourage the reporting of environmental information.  
	
	
On the other hand, other authors such as Calza et al. (2017) show that the presence of 
a two-tier board increases the environmental competences of the different directors, 
improving the commitment of companies with environmental issues compared to those that 
adopt a one-tier board system. Jaffar et al. (2013) suggest that it is expected a positive 
association between a two-tier board structure and voluntary disclosure such as environmental 
reporting, because in these board systems all board directors are non-executive. These board 
members may perform their duties more independent, objective and effectively because they 
are not involved with managerial tasks and cannot hold executive positions. Thus, they might 
encourage the reporting of environmental information and, accordingly, agency cost may be 
mitigated.  
Therefore, according to previous arguments, it seems that a two-tier board structure is 
more likely to encourage environmental reporting than a one-tier board system. Hence, we put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms domiciled in countries with one-tier boards are negatively 
associated with environmental reporting. 
 
3. Empirical Design 
3.1. Sample 
The sample of this study consists of 16,687 firm-year observations companies from 
2005 to 2015 (both inclusive) belonging to 39 different countries (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, 
Luxembourg, Macau, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New, Portugal, 
Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom and United 
States). We collected all information about our variables from Thomson Reuters database, 
which provides corporate governance, economic and financial information. We have removed 
firms from financial sector because they comply with special accounting rules, which make 
more difficult the comparison of their financial statements with those of non-financial firms. 
Additionally, we have also removed that firms for which all data was not available. Therefore, 
our final sample consists of 13,100 international firms, building an unbalanced panel data 
sample, which is as consistent and reliable as balanced panel data (Arellano, 2003). 
Table 1 offers the number of observations by country as well as their percentages over 
the total sample. As can be seen from Table 1, United States is the country with the highest 
representation in the sample (27.58%), followed by Japan (13.48%), United Kingdom 
	
	
(9.19%) and Canada (8.82%), while Isle of Man is the country with the lowest representation 
(0.008%). 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Table 2 provides the 9 sectors in which our sample is divided. We have used the 
TRBC economic classification provided by Thomson Reuters. As can be seen in Table 2, 
more than 21.34% of the analysed companies fit into industrial sector, 18.85% and 14.08% 
represent consumer cyclical and basic materials sectors, respectively. The sector with less 
representation is Telecommunications services sector with 3.95%. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
3.2. Variables 
Environmental disclosure (ED_SCORE) is our dependent variable. Past literature has 
created different types of indexes for measuring it. For example, Hossain et al. (2006) take 
into account 18 items, Iatridis (2013) considers 95 items and Helfaya and Moussa (2017) 32 
items, among others. In line with these authors, we have calculated our dependent variable as 
the addition of several items concerning environmental issues. Each item will take the value 1 
if the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise. Our index consists of 54 
environmental items disclosed by firms, which are classified into three environmental 
categories: (1) resource use; (2) emissions; (3) innovation. Environmental items in the 
category of resource use are: policy water efficiency, policy energy efficiency, policy 
environment supply chain, renewable energy use, green buildings, among others. In the 
classification of emissions have been considered, among others, policy emissions, targets 
emissions, biodiversity impact reduction, emissions trading, climate change commercial risks 
opportunities, particulate matter emission reduction and waste reduction total, while in 
innovation the following items have been examined: environmental products, eco-design 
products, noise reduction, hybrid vehicles, environmental project financing, product 
environmental responsible use, renewable clean energy products and water technologies. 
We have used three different independent variables. Firstly, we define Liberal Market 
Economy as LME and it is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country 
operates in a liberal market economy and 0, if the country operates in a coordinated market 
economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2006; Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2017). The second independent variable represents if the country is a developed or 
developing country and it is labelled as DEVEP. This variable is calculated as a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0, if the firm 
operates in a developing or emerging country. Finally, we also use board structure, defined as 
	
	
BOARD_STRUCTURE, and it is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company has a one-tier board structure and 0, if the company has a two-tier board structure, in 
line with Calza et al. (2017). 
This analysis also includes several control variables representing independent 
directors, board size, boards meetings, CEO duality, firm size, profitability, leverage, CSR 
committees and activity sector. Independent directors (INDEP_MEMBERS) are measured as 
the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the total number of 
directors on boards (Iatridis, 2013; Calza et al., 2017). We also control for board size 
(BSIZE), calculated as the total number of directors on boards (Calza et al., 2017). Activity of 
corporate boards is defined as BMEET and it is calculated as the numbers of meetings held by 
boards each year (Pucheta-Martínez and Chiva-Ortells, in press). Regarding CEO duality 
(CEODUALITY), it is measured as a dummy variable that equals the value 1 if the same 
person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise, in line with 
Helfaya and Moussa (2017). Firm size is denoted as SIZE and it is measured as the log of 
total sales (Iatridis, 2013; Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2017). The variable return on assets is also 
used, denoted as ROA and calculated as the operate income before interests and taxes over 
total assets (Iatridis, 2013). We also control for leverage of the company, defined as LEV. It is 
calculated as the ratio of book value of debt over total assets, in line with Iatridis (2013). CSR 
committee is also controlled and is defined as CSR_COMMT. It is measured as a dummy 
variable that equals the value 1 if firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee 
and 0, otherwise (Helfaya and Moussa, 2017). To measure activity sector, we have used the 
TRBC economic classification provided by Thomson Reuters (Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2017; Yu et al., in press), which considers nine sectors: basic materials, consumer 
cyclical, consumer non-cyclical, energy, healthcare, industrial, technology, 
telecommunications services and utilities. This variable is denoted by SECTOR and is 
measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operates in the sectors 
analysed and 0, otherwise. Finally, we also control for year effects, YEARt, using a dummy 
variable where t represents the years of the sample. In Table 3, we present the summary of all 
the variables used.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Thus, we develop the following empirical model to test our hypotheses: 
 
ED_SCOREit = β0 + β1LMEit + β2DEVEPit + β3BOARD_STRUCTUREit + 
β4INDEP_MEMBERSit + β5BSIZEit + β6BMEETit + β7CEODUALITYit + 
β8SIZEit + β9ROAit + β10LEVit + β11CSR_COMMTit + ∑k=1220 βk SECTORit +  
	
	
∑t=2131 βt YEARt + ηi + µit  
 
where ηi represents constant and non-observables characteristics of firms potentially 
related to environmental disclosure (the unobservable heterogeneity) and µit is the error term. 
The empirical model has been estimated using a Tobit regression panel data. This 
methodology is used when the dependent variable is left- and right-side censored. In our 
research, this variable ranges between 0 and 54, which is the number of items used to 
construct the environmental disclosure index. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of our variables. We find that firms disclose, on 
average, 12.87 items out of 54. With respect to the variables that represent LME and DEVEP, 
the average value is 89.13 % and 89.21% respectively. Thus, 89.13% of the firms of our 
sample operate in liberal market economies and 89.21% in developed economies. 
Furthermore, the variable board structure (BOARD_STRUCTURE) shows, on average, that 
71.85% of the sample boards have a one-tier board. The ROA is, on average, 6.44%, board 
size (BSIZE) is 10.91 members, board meetings (BMEET) are 9.42, CEO duality 
(CEODUALITY) is 29.93%, firm size (SIZE) is 9.64 and leverage (LEV) is 12.90%. We also 
find that, on average, 58.91% of firms have a CSR committee (CSRC) and the proportion of 
independent directors (INDEP_MEMBERS) on boards is, on average, 63.33%. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Table 5 presents the correlations matrix for the variables used in our research. As 
appreciated in Table 5, none of the coefficients is higher than 0.8, in line with Ramón-Llorens 
et al. (2018), who come to the same conclusion. Hence, multicollinearity does not bias the 
coefficients of our model and, accordingly, it is not a concern in our research.  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
4.2. Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Table 6 provides the results obtained for the three models built in order to test our 
three hypotheses.  
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
	
	
In Model 1, the variable LME has a significant and positive sign, as expected. Hence, 
the hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. Our evidence suggests that firms operating in liberal 
market economies disclose more environmental information than companies operating in 
coordinated market economies, consistent with Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) and Hummel 
et al. (2017), who also provide this evidence. Furthermore, authors such as Favotto et al. 
(2016) come to the same conclusion for a research carried out in companies of several 
countries: USA, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The authors find that firms 
operating in LME countries disclose more environmental information, while companies 
operating in CME countries report more in the social fields of labour and human rights. 
This could be explained because in liberal market economies, governments endorse 
less environmental laws, firms commit itself, and society fulfil environmental 
recommendations and principles since the participation of stakeholders are not strongly 
institutionalised. In this regard, Hall and Gingerich (2009) argue that firms located in LME 
countries generally receive financing from large capital markets and these markets have 
typically institutionalized strong disclosure requirements to facilitate contracting (La Porta et 
al., 2006), which generally indicates a greater appreciation of the information disclosed by 
firms operating in LME countries. As the stock market is the most important source of capital, 
companies must provide a high degree of transparency and accountability to shareholders and 
investors (Crane and Matten, 2004). 
In Model 2, the results show a significant and positive relationship between DEVEP 
and ED_SCORE, as predicted. This suggests that companies operating in developed countries 
disclose more environmental information than firms operating in an emerging country or 
developing country. Thus, the hypothesis 2 is also confirmed. This result is consistent with 
prior studies (Bhattacharyya and Cummings, 2014; Wei and Wang, 2016). Our evidence also 
supports the premise that firms located in developed countries are vulnerable to stakeholders’ 
pressures, which are satisfied by reporting more specific environmental information. The 
results obtained are also in line with Dögl and Behnam (2015), who find that in developed 
countries the company's stakeholders are more sensitive to corporate environmental practices. 
In Model 3, the results find that board structure is negative and significantly associated 
with environmental reporting, thus confirming the third hypothesis. Therefore, companies 
with a one-tier board structure are less likely to disclose environmental information. A 
possible explanation is that when all board members have the same tasks and responsibilities, 
outside directors are most likely to fail to carry out their monitory functions correctly (Ahmad 
et al., 2017). Countries under a two-tier board system are more likely to orientate firms 
	
	
toward stakeholders and, therefore, these firms will tend to report more environmental 
information. Calza et al. (2017) also support that the presence of a two-tier board seems to 
increase the environmental competences of the different directors, improving the commitment 
of companies with environmental issues in comparison with those that adopt a one-tier board 
system. 
Regarding control variables, board size, firm size, CSR committees and 
telecommunication services present a positive and statistically sign in all models. The 
proportion of independent directors provides a negative and significant coefficient for Models 
1 and 2. Return on assets is also negative and statistically significant in the three models. 
BMEET presents a negative and significant coefficient only for Model 3, as predicted by 
Pucheta-Martínez and Chiva-Ortells (in press). The remainder of control variables are 
insignificant.  
In this research, it is possible that endogeneity concerns take place and, accordingly, 
we have to check if these concerns exist. We wonder whether firms operating in LME 
countries, in developed countries and with a one-tier board structure affect environmental 
reporting, or, whether companies with a better environmental disclosure are located in LME 
countries, in developed countries and have a two-tier board system. This matter has been 
addressed by lagging the three independent variables and estimating the three models again. 
We provide the findings in Table 7, where it can be observed that they are consistent with the 
core results exhibited in our baseline models. Consequently, we can conclude that our models 
are free of endogeneity problems.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aims to analyse whether the varieties of capitalism and board structure 
might have an impact on environmental disclosure. In this respect, institutional and 
stakeholder approaches are used to explore such association, which is examined by employing 
a sample of 13,100 international firms belonging to 39 countries.  
The findings show that liberal and developed market economies are associated with 
environmental reporting, in line with Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) and Hummel et al. 
(2017). In liberal market economies policymakers tend to issue less laws and rules concerning 
environmental reporting, but companies are engaged with environmental issues. This finding 
suggests that legal requirements are not the most effective mechanism for encouraging a 
higher environmental reporting. Countries with a low level of rules focused on environmental 
issues are more likely to disclose environmental information. Furthermore, the level of 
	
	
economic development of a country is also another factor influencing environmental 
disclosure. Our result is in line with Yu et al. (in press), who report that the disclosure of 
environmental information in developed countries is more relevant for stakeholders since it 
allows them to make decisions not only focused on social and environmental issues, but also 
financial decisions. Finally, one-tier board structure has a negative influence on 
environmental disclosure since this system reduces the objectivity and credibility of the 
directors when monitoring managerial team (Ahmad et al., 2017). Countries where firms have 
a two-tier structure tend to disclose more environmental information, since the supervisory 
board represent an effective mechanism for protecting environmental matters.  
This paper has several implications. Firstly, this research shows that the institutional 
contexts where firms operate are determinants of the disclosure of environmental information. 
Particularly, our evidence reports that companies located in LME countries and in developed 
countries are more likely to disclose environmental information. The scarce regulation toward 
environmental issues in LME countries and, the economic development in developed 
countries may support the fact that companies in these types of countries are more engaged 
with environmental issues by reporting environmental information. Thus, firms operating in 
countries with strong regulation on environmental practices and low economic development 
should think about extending their business to LME and developed countries if these 
companies are sensitive toward environmental issues. Secondly, our results show that the type 
of board structures (one-tier or two-tier boards) is a factor to take into account when 
environmental disclosure is addressed. One-tier or two-tier board structures depend on the 
legal system of each country and firms with a two-tier board system tend to report more 
environmental information. Thus, stakeholders located in countries where two-tier board 
structures prevail will be more likely to receive environmental information and, therefore, 
there is a high probability that their needs and interests are satisfied. Thirdly, this paper may 
be of interest for regulatory bodies because our findings report that stricter regulations about 
environmental practices not necessarily result in better environmental actions such as the 
disclosure of environmental information. Maybe it would be more relevant that policymakers 
take actions in line with becoming aware firms, managers and other business actors on the 
relevance of reporting environmental issues. Fourthly, researchers should extend our research 
exploring the effect of other characteristics of different institutional contexts on 
environmental disclosure. Race, religion or gender diversity are demographic factors, which 
depend on the institutional context and, thereby, they merit our attention.  
	
	
The findings of this study should be interpreted in light of certain limitations. It is 
possible that there are unknown factors that could affect our dependent variable, which it is 
possible that we have disregarded.  
The authors observe some opportunities for future research. Firstly, scholars may 
extend the results of this study by exploring the factors impacting the quality of 
environmental information disclosed by listed firms. Secondly, it would be interesting to 
analyse if the existence of a sustainability committee could encourage firms to engage in 
socially responsible actions. 
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Number of observations by country 
  
Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia 816 6.229 6.229 
Austria 41 0.313 6.542 
Belgium 97 0.740 7.282 
Bermuda 15 0.115 7.397 
Brazil 257 1.962 9.359 
Canada 1,155 8.817 18.176 
Chile 106 0.809 18.985 
China 335 2.557 21.542 
Czech Republic 8 0.061 21.603 
Denmark 112 0.855 22.458 
Egypt 22 0.168 22.626 
Finland 142 1.084 23.710 
France 575 4.389 28.099 
Germany 405 3.092 31.191 
Greece 10 0.076 31.267 
Hong Kong 126 0.962 32.229 
India 170 1.298 33.527 
Ireland; 174 1.328 34.855 
Isle of Man 1 0.008 34.863 
Israel 6 0.046 34.908 
Italy 132 1.008 35.916 
Japan 1,766 13.481 49.397 
Jersey 20 0.153 49.550 
Luxembourg 65 0.496 50.046 
	
	
Macau 5 0.038 50.084 
Mexico 122 0.931 51.015 
Netherlan 220 1.679 52.695 
New Zealand 53 0.405 53.099 
Norway 70 0.534 53.634 
Papua New 7 0.053 53.687 
Portugal 29 0.221 53.908 
Russia 190 1.450 55.359 
South Africa 80 0.611 55.969 
Spain 207 1.580 57.550 
Sweden 259 1.977 59.527 
Switzerland 389 2.969 62.496 
Thailand 97 0.740 63.237 
United Kingdom 1,204 9.191 72.427 
United States 3,612 27.573 100 








Number of observations by activity sector 
TRBC economic sector name Number of observations 
Percentage Cum. 
Basic Materials 1,845 14.084 14.084 
Consumer cyclical. 2,469 18.847 32.931 
Consumer Non-Cyclical 1,293 9.870 42.802 
Energy 1,310 10.000 52.802 
Healthcare 1,016 7.756 60.557 
Industrial 2,795 21.336 81.893 
Technology 1,022 7.802 89.695 
Telecommunications Services 518 3.954 93.649 
Utilities 832 6.351 100 






ED_ SCORE The aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if 
the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise. 
LME Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market 
economy and 0 if the country operates in a coordinated market economy 
DEVEP Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 
0 if the firm operates in a developing country 
BOARD_STRUCTURE Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier board and 0 if the 
company has a two-tier board 
INDEP_MEMBERS The ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the 
total number of directors on boards 
BSIZE The total number of directors on boards  
	
	
BMEET The numbers of meetings held by boards each year 
CEODUALITY Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as 
CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise 
SIZE The log of total sales  
ROA Operate income before interests and taxes over total assets 
LEV Debt over total assets 
CSR_COMMT Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social 
Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise 
BASIC MATERIALS Dummy variable: 1=  Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise  
CONSUMER CYCLICALS Dummy variable: 1=  Consumer Cyclicals; 0 = Otherwise  
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICALS Dummy variable: 1=  Consumer Non-Cyclicals; 0 = Otherwise  
ENERGY Dummy variable: 1= Energy; 0 = Otherwise  
HEALTHCARE Dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise  
INDUSTRIALS Dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise  
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise  
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES Dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise  








Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 p50 P75 
ED_ SCORE 13,100 12.872 9.308 4.000 12.000 21.000 
LME 13,100 89.129 38.129 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DEVEP 13,100 89.205 31.032 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BOARD_STRUCTURE 13,100 71.845 44.977 0.000 1.000 1.000 
INDEP_MEMBERS 13,100 63.325 26.381 46.667 70.000 85.714 
BSIZE 13,100 10.905 3.561 9.000 10.000 13.000 
BMEET 13,100 9.421 5.247 6.000 8.000 11.000 
CEODUALITY 13,100 29.926 45.795 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 13,100 9.643 1.479 9.394 9.806 10.241 
ROA 13,100 6.439 8.446 2.764 5.575 9.584 
LEV 13,100 12.900 217.720 2.661 5.723 10.779 
CSR_COMMT 13,100 58.905 49.202 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BASIC MATERIALS 13,100 14.085 34.788 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER 
CYCLICALS 13,100 18.848 39.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICALS 13,100 9.870 29.828 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ENERGY 13,100 10.000 30.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HEALTHCARE 13,100 7.756 26.749 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INDUSTRIALS 13,100 21.337 40.971 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TECHNOLOGY 13,100 7.802 26.821 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 13,100 3.955 19.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UTILITIES 13,100 6.344 24.376 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean. standard deviation and percentiles. ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the 
value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country 
operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy 
	
	
variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0 if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE 
is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; 
INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards; 
BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings held by boards each year; CEODUALITY is the 
Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the 
log of total sales; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMM Tis the 
Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if 
the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer 
Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, 
otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare 
sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company 
operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
ED_SCORE (1) 1.000 
                    
LME  (2) 0.062 *** 1.000 
                   
DEVEP  (3) 0.063*** 0.696*** 1.000 
                  
BOARD_STRUCTURE  (4) -0.185*** 0.011 0.013 1.000 
                 
INDEP_MEMBERS  (5) -0.022** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.387*** 1.000 
                
BSIZE  (6) 0.313*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.055*** -0.077*** 1.000 
               
BMEET (7) 0.080*** -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.160*** -0.112*** -0.085*** 1.000 
              
CEODUALITY  (8) 0.017* 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.170*** 0.192*** 0.091*** -0.105*** 1.000 
             
SIZE  (9) 0.505*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.112*** 0.041*** 0.501*** 0.046*** 0.133*** 1.000 
            
ROA  (10) -0.134*** -0.098*** -0.099*** 0.210*** 0.093*** -0.085*** -0.233*** 0.023*** -0.199*** 1.000 
           
LEV  (11) 0.141*** -0.000 0.003 -0.076*** -0.013 0.174*** 0.092*** 0.024*** 0.285** -0.379*** 1.000 
          
CSR_COMMT  (12) 0.616*** 0.051*** 0.053*** -0.069*** 0.011 0.184*** 0.111*** -0.029*** 0.289*** -0.131*** 0.102*** 1.000 
         
BASIC MATERIALS  (13) 0.053*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.046*** 0.000 -0.064*** 0.013 -0.087*** -0.061*** -0.074*** -0.047*** 0.085*** 1.000 
        
CONSUMER CYCLICALS  (14) -0.053*** 0.079*** 0.078** 0.041*** -0.066*** -0.015* -0.105*** 0.011 -0.083*** 0.030*** -0.033*** -0.049*** -0.195*** 1.000 
       
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS  (15) 0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 0.034*** -0.036*** 0.063*** -0.020** 0.003 0.006 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.033*** -0.134*** -0.159*** 1.000 
      
ENERGY  (16) -0.059*** -0.123*** -0.124*** 0.087*** 0.076** -0.0169 0.010 0.012 0.093*** 0.043*** -0.097*** 0.001 -0.135*** -0.161*** -0.110*** 1.000 
     
HEALTHCARE  (17) -0.064*** 0.057*** 0.057*** -0.003 0.087** -0.074*** -0.016** 0.024*** -0.075*** 0.087*** -0.091*** -0.046*** -0.117*** -0.139*** -0.096*** -0.097*** 1.000 
    
INDUSTRIALS  (18) 0.019** 0.071*** 0.070*** -0.119*** -0.075*** 0.038*** 0.022** 0.013 0.002 -0.081*** 0.131*** -0.011 -0.117*** -0.139*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.043*** 1.000 
   
TECHNOLOGY  (19) 0.013 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.026*** 0.052**** -0.079**** 0.006 0.023 -0.065*** 0.103 -0.219*** -0.056*** -0.118*** -0.140*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.084**** -0.152*** 1.000 
 
  
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES  (20)	-0.014 -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.008 -0.024** 0.073*** 0.090*** -0.012 0.105*** -0.009 0.113*** -0.013 -0.082*** -0.098*** -0.067**** -0.068*** -0.059 -0.106*** -0.059*** 
 
  






Correlation matrix. ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable 
equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed 
country and 0 if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; 
INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards; BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings 
held by boards each year; CEODUALITY is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total sales; ROA is operate 
income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMMT is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; 
BASIC MATERIALS if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS 
if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates 




Multivariate analysis results 
 












DEVEP  4.001*** 
(0.000) 
 












































































































ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the 
firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country 
operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0 
if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier 
board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the 
total number of directors on boards; BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings held by boards each year; 
CEODUALITY is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; 
SIZE is the log of total sales; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMMT is 
the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if the 
company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 
0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the 
company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS 
if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company 
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ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the 
firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country 
operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0 
if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier 
board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the 
total number of directors on boards; BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings held by boards each year; 
CEODUALITY is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; 
SIZE is the log of total sales; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMMT is 
the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if the 
company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 
0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the 
company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS 
if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company 
operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01 
	
	
BOARD STRUCTURES, LIBERAL COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPED 
MARKET ECONOMIES. DO THEY MATTER IN ENVIRONMENTAL 




Preceding empirical evidence has shown the effect of most corporate governance mechanisms 
on CSR and environmental disclosure. However, there is scant empirical evidence based on 
examining the influence of liberal countries, developed market economies and board 
structures on environmental disclosure. Thus, this research aims at exploring how liberal and 
developed countries and board structures affect environmental reporting. We hypothesise that 
there is a linear and positive association between firms located in countries with liberal and 
developed market economies and environmental reporting. Moreover, we also hypothesise 
that one-tier board structures affect negatively environmental disclosure. Focusing on 13,100 
firms from 2005 to 2015 domiciled in 39 different countries, we find that firms located in 
liberal and developed economies are more likely to disclose environmental information, while 
one-tier boards have a negative effect on it.  
 
Keywords: Environmental disclosure, varieties of capitalism, developed countries, one-tier 

















There is a growing concern in society about the commitment of businesses toward 
environmental issues (Mårtensson and Westerberg, 2016). As a result, companies are more 
engaged with corporate sustainability reporting practices (Gray et al., 1995), tending 
particularly to disclose more social and environmental information to their stakeholders. 
According to Azzone et al. (1997), the environmental report shows the extent to which the 
company’s products impact on the environment, its engagement with stakeholders and the 
relevance of the strategic environmental management of the firm. Among the reasons why 
companies disclose environmental information, there are several. For Deegan and Samkin 
(2006), one of the reasons is to show the responsibility of the company in environmental 
issues toward the society and to respond to stakeholders’ expectations. For Vanhamme and 
Grobben (2009), the most important is to protect the reputation and identity of the company 
engaging with interested parties through what others have described as a form of moral 
discourse. Another reason for companies to disclose environmental information is to improve 
their image. 
Most of past research based on the environmental field has focused on analysing 
business characteristics affecting environmental disclosure such as size, leverage or 
profitability that affect environmental disclosure (Rizwan and Ali, 2013, Eleftheriadis and 
Anagnostopoulou, 2015). Other scholars have explored the impact of environmental reporting 
on corporate performance (Hassan and Romilly, in press) or the quality of environmental 
disclosure (Iatridis, 2013). However, other issues related to the institutional environment, the 
economic development and the geographic area have received less attention by researchers 
and, therefore, their effect on environmental reporting merits a deeper analysis. Thus, the aim 
of our research focuses on examining how countries located in liberal and developed market 
economies and board structures impact on environmental disclosure. 
Regarding a liberal market economy, it is placed within the framework of varieties of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which considers companies as the core of analysis and it 
is an appropriate framework to explore the differences among countries at a company level in 
environmental matters. In relation to developed countries, there is still a great controversy 
about their influence on environmental disclosure by companies in comparison to developing 
countries. In the case of board structures, there is also debate on whether the presence of a 
one-tier or two-tier board increases the environmental competences of the different directors 
in order to improve environmental disclosure by companies. 
	
	
According to above arguments, there are different theories underlying the disclosure of 
environmental information, particularly institutional and stakeholder theory. The institutional 
theory tries to explain why companies evolve and behave in a particular way (Hall, 1996). In 
this regard, Scott (1995) posits that institutions are management processes based on rules that 
transcend companies and characterise their social behaviour. In this context, institutions will 
help understand corporate environmental reporting not only as a voluntary discourse, but also 
as a requirement imposed by the business environment. On the other hand, stakeholder theory 
recognises that in addition to creditors and shareholders, there are other players who are 
interested in knowing the environmental performance of companies and, therefore, they 
demand information on the environmental impact of their activities. Thus, to the extent that 
companies recognise the legitimacy of their stakeholders, they tend to voluntarily report their 
environmental information to meet their requests (Deegan, 2002). 
This study contributes to prior literature focused on environmental disclosure in 
several ways. Firstly, this study is based on 39 countries, which allows us to analyse the 
importance of separating them between liberal and developed market economies and of 
exploring their impact on environmental reporting. Secondly, although past research mostly 
focuses on greenhouse gas emissions (Hassan and Romilly, in press), climate change 
(Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou, 2015) or carbon disclosure (Calza et al., 2017), this 
research also takes into account other environmental factors in the environmental disclosure 
measures such as renewable clean energy products, policy energy efficiency or environment 
management training, among others, which gives a comprehensive view of how businesses 
manage the disclosure of environmental issues in the countries analysed. Thirdly, we have 
tried to answer the following questions: a) What is the association between companies 
domiciled in countries operating in liberal market economies and environmental disclosure?, 
b) What is the relationship between firms domiciled in countries operating in developed 
market economies and environmental reporting? and c) What is the effect of board structures 
on environmental disclosure?. 
The results show that liberal and developed market economies have a positive impact 
on environmental disclosure, while board structure affects negatively. We argue that the 
country origin is a relevant factor in the disclosure of environmental information companies 
(Gray et al., 1995; Reverte, 2009). Moreover, board structure has a negative effect on 
environmental disclosure when there is a one-tier system, since this structure does not 
guarantee board independence and, therefore, it does not engage with stakeholders’ needs 
such as environmental disclosure.  
	
	
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical 
background and hypotheses. The third section describes the methodology of the study, the 
sample and the variables. The fourth section presents the findings of the study and, finally, the 
fifth section contains a summary of the findings, draws conclusions, and provides limitations 
and future lines of research.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
The existence of a unique theoretical framework to explain the determinants of 
corporate environmental disclosure is still difficult to achieve (Gray et al., 1995). Authors 
such as Cormier and Gordon (2001) argue that the association between the political, social 
and institutional context and environmental disclosure are theoretically supported by socio-
political theories. Among social-political theories, the institutional and stakeholder 
approaches are considered of the most relevant. Precisely, we focus on institutional and 
stakeholder theories to explore how liberal economies, developed market economies and 
board structures affect environmental reporting. These theories have also been used by Dögl 
and Behnam (2015) in the corporate environmental responsibility’s context. 
Institutional theory posits an explanation of why companies evolve and behave in a 
particular way (Hall, 1996). In this regard, Scott (1995) shows that institutions are steering 
processes focused on rules, which transcend companies and characterise their social 
behaviour. Institutional theory argues that companies operating in similar environments tend 
to adopt the same strategic behaviour and focus on the deeper aspects of social structures 
(DiMaggio and Powel, 1983, Claessens and Fan, 2002). According to this theory, the 
structures that include routines, norms, schemes and rules are established as authorized 
guidelines for social behaviour (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Institutional approach also 
supports the idea that companies respond to the pressures of their stakeholders (e.g., demand 
for environmental disclosure) by imitating the practices of leading companies in their industry 
with the aim of gaining legitimacy (Aerts et al., 2006). In this context, institutions help 
understand corporate environmental reporting not only as a voluntary discourse, but also as a 
requirement imposed by the corporate environment.  
 
This process is called isomorphism by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Isomorphism 
refers to a process in which a company behaves similarly to another company by adopting the 
characteristics of the other organization (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007). The structures of the 
companies are influenced by their social and institutional environment and, therefore, the 
	
	
companies that wish to survive use isomorphism by adapting to their external context (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991). This is due to the fact the companies operating under the same 
institutional environment are pressured to behave in a similar way, which leads companies to 
be homogeneous within a particular context and, accordingly, these companies will adopt, for 
example, the same model of environmental disclosure. In this regard, Brammer et al. (2012) 
consider that institutional theory will be an appropriate framework for understanding and 
explaining how and why environmental issues assume different forms in different countries. 
Stakeholder approach argues that companies should consider all stakeholders demands 
when environmental strategies are implemented because if stakeholders are disregarded, then, 
there is risk that they will withdraw their support to firms. Environmental disclosure is 
considered a relevant tool for mitigating stakeholders’ pressure regarding environmental 
matters when there are not environmental regulations (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Thus, to 
the extent that firms recognise the legitimacy of their stakeholders, they tend to voluntarily 
report on environmental aspects to meet their needs (Deegan, 2002).  
Stakeholders can be classified into two categories: external stakeholders, who are 
suppliers, creditors, agencies, customers, governments, among others; and internal 
stakeholders, who are managers, employees and shareholders (Mitroff, 1983; Ferrell et al., 
2009). The interaction between firms’ managers and stakeholders is reciprocal (Wernerfelt, 
1984) since stakeholders provide resources to firms, which allow them to survive, while that 
firms will satisfy stakeholders’ interests and demands. In this regard, Roberts (1992) 
documents that environmental disclosure is considered as a part of the dialogue between firms 
and their stakeholders. The latter are interested in knowing the environmental performance of 
firms and, therefore, they will demand firms information on the environmental impact of their 
activities.  
Drawing on institutional and stakeholder theories, we examine how countries located 




2.1. Liberal market economies  
According to Hall and Soskice (2001), the varieties of capitalism depend on the social 
agents and institutional contexts, which are result of political commitments, being the 
institutional theory the most widely used to analyse corporate environmental disclosure 
(Matten and Moon, 2008) in cross-country research. In this regard, Jackson and Apostolakou 
	
	
(2010) based their research on institutional theory in order to explore the association between 
the varieties of capitalism and the context of corporate social and environmental reporting.  
The varieties of capitalism are situated within the institutional theory, developed in the 
political economy to understand the institutional differences and similarities among the 
economies. According to the varieties of capitalism approach, firms are considered the core of 
the analysis, considering also what governments can and cannot achieve. Hence, this 
perspective is a suitable framework for examining the differences among countries at 
company level in environmental matters (Gjølberg, 2009, Hartmann and Uhlenbruck, 2015). 
The main emphasis of scholars in this field focuses on the distinctive nature of the 
national institutional contexts where companies operate, in aspects such as the legal system 
and government, the financing sources and the education systems. They postulate that there is 
a coordinated market economy (CME) when companies interact to solve problems oriented to 
stakeholders, while liberal market economies (LME) occur when the shareholders and 
creditors prevail in front of other stakeholders. According to Kang and Moon (2012), CME 
are characterised by strong state dominance and influenced by the interests of organizations 
such as employers' associations and unions, whereas LME countries are characterised by 
strong market dominance and a strong notion of property rights. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) also refer to LME and CME by indicating that LME is 
characterised by active capital markets, dispersed ownership, flexible labour market and weak 
cooperation link between businesses, in contrast to CME, which is characterised by capital 
markets with low activity, ownership concentration, rigid labour market, and strong inter-firm 
cooperation. According to the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, LME firms may 
adopt voluntarily policies and practices based on social and environmental issues (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2006) since the participation of stakeholders are not strongly institutionalised. 
Contrary to this, companies operating in CME may adopt many implicit forms of corporate 
social responsibility such as environmental issues, being stronger in the adoption of minimum 
standards of corporate social responsibility (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010).	 In line with 
above arguments, Hummel et al. (2017) find that in LME there is relatively less regulation on 
corporate social responsibility practices such as environmental disclosure, but firms are more 
engaged with the disclosure of social and environmental information, while CME countries 
have more environmental regulations, but the reporting of social and environmental issues is 
limited. It can, therefore, be assumed that companies located in liberal market economies are 
more likely to disclose corporate social responsibility information such as environmental 
	
	
matters than companies located in coordinated market economies. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms domiciled in countries with liberal market economies are 
positively associated with environmental reporting.  
 
2.2. Developed countries  
Developing countries in comparison to developed countries may not disclose 
environmental information since society in these countries is, in general, less strict in the 
demand of this information and are less informed. Additionally, as Tsang (1998) evidences, 
the increase in the level of CSR disclosure in developing countries such as Singapore is due to 
the presence of several big multinationals firms from developed countries operating in these 
developing countries. Past literature focused on developing countries shows a decrease in 
environmental reporting (De Villers et al., 2006) because the expectations over the time have 
changed (Lindblom, 1994). On the other hand, Yu et al. (in press) show that the disclosure of 
environmental information is high in countries where the level of economic development is 
high, due to higher levels of resources and greater awareness of social and environmental 
problems.  
In this respect, Dögl and Behnam (2015) argue that in a study carried out by the Press 
Freedom Index 2011/12, several differences are found in environmental matters between 
Germany or the USA as developed countries compared to other less developed countries such 
as India, which occupies a Rank of 131 with respect to Germany with the position 16 and 
USA 47. This can be due to the fact that in these developed countries, stakeholders’ firms are 
more sensitive to corporate environmental practices. 
Preceding empirical research (Gnyawali, 1996; Husted, 2005) also supports the view 
that economic development is a relevant driver for increasing environmental disclosure. In 
this regard, Gnyawali (1996) finds that rich societies tend to demand firms more social and 
environmentally responsible performance because people in these societies are better 
informed. Yu et al. (in press) also report that in countries with a high level of economic 
development, namely, developed countries, firms are more likely to disclose environmental 
information. These authors argue that their findings were expected because as other scholars 
evidence (Gnyawali, 1996; Husted, 2005), low economic development contributes to the 
environmental degradation. According to stakeholder perspective, in developed market 
economies it is more likely to disclose environmental information since this information is 
more relevant for stakeholders to make relevant decisions related to social and financial 
	
	
issues. Firms provide environmental and specific information, which is more sensible for 
stakeholders, but in addition, as Aldrugi and Abdo (2014) find, companies report 
environmental information because they have many other concerns, including reputation, 
legal requirements and public pressures. Thus, the hypothesis proposed is the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms domiciled in countries with developed market economies are 
positively associated with environmental reporting. 
 
2.3. Board Structure 
There are two prevalent board structures, one-tier board or unitary model, and two-tier 
board or dual model (supervisory and management board are separated). One-tier boards are 
composed by both executive and non-executive directors and CEO duality is possible. In 
contrast, two-tier boards are characterised by independent management and supervisory 
boards (Choudhur, 2017) and CEO duality cannot take place. Supervisory boards are 
composed by non-executive or outside directors, whose functions are based on advising and 
monitoring management behaviour. On the other hand, management boards are integrated by 
executive directors, whose activities are focused on managing daily firms. Thus, a two-tier 
board structure will be a better system than a one-tier board structure because all its board 
members are non-executive. This allows them to be more objective and more independent in 
monitoring and controlling the performance of executive managers.  
In one-tier board system, corporate boards are considered the highest governing body, 
whose main functions are the establishment of company’s policies and make important 
strategic decision, among other things. In this regard, in a one-tier board system, boards can 
be made up by both executive and non-executive members. Boards represent shareholders and 
their directors, mainly non-executive, will have to monitor behaviours, decisions and policies 
of management team, which have to be in line with shareholders and stakeholders’ 
expectations (Dunn and Sainty, 2009). However, the credibility, independence and objectivity 
of executive directors when monitoring managers may be challenged since they may be also 
part of the management team (Ahmad et al., 2017). Consequently, independent directors lose 
the ability to monitor managers’ behaviour and the decision making process because 
independent and executive directors share the same board (Block and Gerstner, 2016) and, 
accordingly, the latter might control and influence all decisions made by independent 
directors. Thus, in one-tier system it is more difficult to find ways for guaranteeing that a 
certain number of board members are independent and, thereby, it is more likely that 
members in one-tier board structures discourage the reporting of environmental information.  
	
	
On the other hand, other authors such as Calza et al. (2017) show that the presence of 
a two-tier board increases the environmental competences of the different directors, 
improving the commitment of companies with environmental issues compared to those that 
adopt a one-tier board system. Jaffar et al. (2013) suggest that it is expected a positive 
association between a two-tier board structure and voluntary disclosure such as environmental 
reporting, because in these board systems all board directors are non-executive. These board 
members may perform their duties more independent, objective and effectively because they 
are not involved with managerial tasks and cannot hold executive positions. Thus, they might 
encourage the reporting of environmental information and, accordingly, agency cost may be 
mitigated.  
Therefore, according to previous arguments, it seems that a two-tier board structure is 
more likely to encourage environmental reporting than a one-tier board system. Hence, we put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms domiciled in countries with one-tier boards are negatively 
associated with environmental reporting. 
 
3. Empirical Design 
3.1. Sample 
The sample of this study consists of 16,687 firm-year observations companies from 
2005 to 2015 (both inclusive) belonging to 39 different countries (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, 
Luxembourg, Macau, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New, Portugal, 
Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom and United 
States). We collected all information about our variables from Thomson Reuters database, 
which provides corporate governance, economic and financial information. We have removed 
firms from financial sector because they comply with special accounting rules, which make 
more difficult the comparison of their financial statements with those of non-financial firms. 
Additionally, we have also removed that firms for which all data was not available. Therefore, 
our final sample consists of 13,100 international firms, building an unbalanced panel data 
sample, which is as consistent and reliable as balanced panel data (Arellano, 2003). 
Table 1 offers the number of observations by country as well as their percentages over 
the total sample. As can be seen from Table 1, United States is the country with the highest 
representation in the sample (27.58%), followed by Japan (13.48%), United Kingdom 
	
	
(9.19%) and Canada (8.82%), while Isle of Man is the country with the lowest representation 
(0.008%). 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Table 2 provides the 9 sectors in which our sample is divided. We have used the 
TRBC economic classification provided by Thomson Reuters. As can be seen in Table 2, 
more than 21.34% of the analysed companies fit into industrial sector, 18.85% and 14.08% 
represent consumer cyclical and basic materials sectors, respectively. The sector with less 
representation is Telecommunications services sector with 3.95%. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
3.2. Variables 
Environmental disclosure (ED_SCORE) is our dependent variable. Past literature has 
created different types of indexes for measuring it. For example, Hossain et al. (2006) take 
into account 18 items, Iatridis (2013) considers 95 items and Helfaya and Moussa (2017) 32 
items, among others. In line with these authors, we have calculated our dependent variable as 
the addition of several items concerning environmental issues. Each item will take the value 1 
if the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise. Our index consists of 54 
environmental items disclosed by firms, which are classified into three environmental 
categories: (1) resource use; (2) emissions; (3) innovation. Environmental items in the 
category of resource use are: policy water efficiency, policy energy efficiency, policy 
environment supply chain, renewable energy use, green buildings, among others. In the 
classification of emissions have been considered, among others, policy emissions, targets 
emissions, biodiversity impact reduction, emissions trading, climate change commercial risks 
opportunities, particulate matter emission reduction and waste reduction total, while in 
innovation the following items have been examined: environmental products, eco-design 
products, noise reduction, hybrid vehicles, environmental project financing, product 
environmental responsible use, renewable clean energy products and water technologies. 
We have used three different independent variables. Firstly, we define Liberal Market 
Economy as LME and it is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country 
operates in a liberal market economy and 0, if the country operates in a coordinated market 
economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2006; Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2017). The second independent variable represents if the country is a developed or 
developing country and it is labelled as DEVEP. This variable is calculated as a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0, if the firm 
operates in a developing or emerging country. Finally, we also use board structure, defined as 
	
	
BOARD_STRUCTURE, and it is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company has a one-tier board structure and 0, if the company has a two-tier board structure, in 
line with Calza et al. (2017). 
This analysis also includes several control variables representing independent 
directors, board size, boards meetings, CEO duality, firm size, profitability, leverage, CSR 
committees and activity sector. Independent directors (INDEP_MEMBERS) are measured as 
the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the total number of 
directors on boards (Iatridis, 2013; Calza et al., 2017). We also control for board size 
(BSIZE), calculated as the total number of directors on boards (Calza et al., 2017). Activity of 
corporate boards is defined as BMEET and it is calculated as the numbers of meetings held by 
boards each year (Pucheta-Martínez and Chiva-Ortells, in press). Regarding CEO duality 
(CEODUALITY), it is measured as a dummy variable that equals the value 1 if the same 
person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise, in line with 
Helfaya and Moussa (2017). Firm size is denoted as SIZE and it is measured as the log of 
total sales (Iatridis, 2013; Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2017). The variable return on assets is also 
used, denoted as ROA and calculated as the operate income before interests and taxes over 
total assets (Iatridis, 2013). We also control for leverage of the company, defined as LEV. It is 
calculated as the ratio of book value of debt over total assets, in line with Iatridis (2013). CSR 
committee is also controlled and is defined as CSR_COMMT. It is measured as a dummy 
variable that equals the value 1 if firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee 
and 0, otherwise (Helfaya and Moussa, 2017). To measure activity sector, we have used the 
TRBC economic classification provided by Thomson Reuters (Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2017; Yu et al., in press), which considers nine sectors: basic materials, consumer 
cyclical, consumer non-cyclical, energy, healthcare, industrial, technology, 
telecommunications services and utilities. This variable is denoted by SECTOR and is 
measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operates in the sectors 
analysed and 0, otherwise. Finally, we also control for year effects, YEARt, using a dummy 
variable where t represents the years of the sample. In Table 3, we present the summary of all 
the variables used.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Thus, we develop the following empirical model to test our hypotheses: 
 
ED_SCOREit = β0 + β1LMEit + β2DEVEPit + β3BOARD_STRUCTUREit + 
β4INDEP_MEMBERSit + β5BSIZEit + β6BMEETit + β7CEODUALITYit + 
β8SIZEit + β9ROAit + β10LEVit + β11CSR_COMMTit + ∑k=1220 βk SECTORit +  
	
	
∑t=2131 βt YEARt + ηi + µit  
 
where ηi represents constant and non-observables characteristics of firms potentially 
related to environmental disclosure (the unobservable heterogeneity) and µit is the error term. 
The empirical model has been estimated using a Tobit regression panel data. This 
methodology is used when the dependent variable is left- and right-side censored. In our 
research, this variable ranges between 0 and 54, which is the number of items used to 
construct the environmental disclosure index. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of our variables. We find that firms disclose, on 
average, 12.87 items out of 54. With respect to the variables that represent LME and DEVEP, 
the average value is 89.13 % and 89.21% respectively. Thus, 89.13% of the firms of our 
sample operate in liberal market economies and 89.21% in developed economies. 
Furthermore, the variable board structure (BOARD_STRUCTURE) shows, on average, that 
71.85% of the sample boards have a one-tier board. The ROA is, on average, 6.44%, board 
size (BSIZE) is 10.91 members, board meetings (BMEET) are 9.42, CEO duality 
(CEODUALITY) is 29.93%, firm size (SIZE) is 9.64 and leverage (LEV) is 12.90%. We also 
find that, on average, 58.91% of firms have a CSR committee (CSRC) and the proportion of 
independent directors (INDEP_MEMBERS) on boards is, on average, 63.33%. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Table 5 presents the correlations matrix for the variables used in our research. As 
appreciated in Table 5, none of the coefficients is higher than 0.8, in line with Ramón-Llorens 
et al. (2018), who come to the same conclusion. Hence, multicollinearity does not bias the 
coefficients of our model and, accordingly, it is not a concern in our research.  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
4.2. Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Table 6 provides the results obtained for the three models built in order to test our 
three hypotheses.  
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
	
	
In Model 1, the variable LME has a significant and positive sign, as expected. Hence, 
the hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. Our evidence suggests that firms operating in liberal 
market economies disclose more environmental information than companies operating in 
coordinated market economies, consistent with Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) and Hummel 
et al. (2017), who also provide this evidence. Furthermore, authors such as Favotto et al. 
(2016) come to the same conclusion for a research carried out in companies of several 
countries: USA, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The authors find that firms 
operating in LME countries disclose more environmental information, while companies 
operating in CME countries report more in the social fields of labour and human rights. 
This could be explained because in liberal market economies, governments endorse 
less environmental laws, firms commit itself, and society fulfil environmental 
recommendations and principles since the participation of stakeholders are not strongly 
institutionalised. In this regard, Hall and Gingerich (2009) argue that firms located in LME 
countries generally receive financing from large capital markets and these markets have 
typically institutionalized strong disclosure requirements to facilitate contracting (La Porta et 
al., 2006), which generally indicates a greater appreciation of the information disclosed by 
firms operating in LME countries. As the stock market is the most important source of capital, 
companies must provide a high degree of transparency and accountability to shareholders and 
investors (Crane and Matten, 2004). 
In Model 2, the results show a significant and positive relationship between DEVEP 
and ED_SCORE, as predicted. This suggests that companies operating in developed countries 
disclose more environmental information than firms operating in an emerging country or 
developing country. Thus, the hypothesis 2 is also confirmed. This result is consistent with 
prior studies (Bhattacharyya and Cummings, 2014; Wei and Wang, 2016). Our evidence also 
supports the premise that firms located in developed countries are vulnerable to stakeholders’ 
pressures, which are satisfied by reporting more specific environmental information. The 
results obtained are also in line with Dögl and Behnam (2015), who find that in developed 
countries the company's stakeholders are more sensitive to corporate environmental practices. 
In Model 3, the results find that board structure is negative and significantly associated 
with environmental reporting, thus confirming the third hypothesis. Therefore, companies 
with a one-tier board structure are less likely to disclose environmental information. A 
possible explanation is that when all board members have the same tasks and responsibilities, 
outside directors are most likely to fail to carry out their monitory functions correctly (Ahmad 
et al., 2017). Countries under a two-tier board system are more likely to orientate firms 
	
	
toward stakeholders and, therefore, these firms will tend to report more environmental 
information. Calza et al. (2017) also support that the presence of a two-tier board seems to 
increase the environmental competences of the different directors, improving the commitment 
of companies with environmental issues in comparison with those that adopt a one-tier board 
system. 
Regarding control variables, board size, firm size, CSR committees and 
telecommunication services present a positive and statistically sign in all models. The 
proportion of independent directors provides a negative and significant coefficient for Models 
1 and 2. Return on assets is also negative and statistically significant in the three models. 
BMEET presents a negative and significant coefficient only for Model 3, as predicted by 
Pucheta-Martínez and Chiva-Ortells (in press). The remainder of control variables are 
insignificant.  
In this research, it is possible that endogeneity concerns take place and, accordingly, 
we have to check if these concerns exist. We wonder whether firms operating in LME 
countries, in developed countries and with a one-tier board structure affect environmental 
reporting, or, whether companies with a better environmental disclosure are located in LME 
countries, in developed countries and have a two-tier board system. This matter has been 
addressed by lagging the three independent variables and estimating the three models again. 
We provide the findings in Table 7, where it can be observed that they are consistent with the 
core results exhibited in our baseline models. Consequently, we can conclude that our models 
are free of endogeneity problems.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aims to analyse whether the varieties of capitalism and board structure 
might have an impact on environmental disclosure. In this respect, institutional and 
stakeholder approaches are used to explore such association, which is examined by employing 
a sample of 13,100 international firms belonging to 39 countries.  
The findings show that liberal and developed market economies are associated with 
environmental reporting, in line with Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) and Hummel et al. 
(2017). In liberal market economies policymakers tend to issue less laws and rules concerning 
environmental reporting, but companies are engaged with environmental issues. This finding 
suggests that legal requirements are not the most effective mechanism for encouraging a 
higher environmental reporting. Countries with a low level of rules focused on environmental 
issues are more likely to disclose environmental information. Furthermore, the level of 
	
	
economic development of a country is also another factor influencing environmental 
disclosure. Our result is in line with Yu et al. (in press), who report that the disclosure of 
environmental information in developed countries is more relevant for stakeholders since it 
allows them to make decisions not only focused on social and environmental issues, but also 
financial decisions. Finally, one-tier board structure has a negative influence on 
environmental disclosure since this system reduces the objectivity and credibility of the 
directors when monitoring managerial team (Ahmad et al., 2017). Countries where firms have 
a two-tier structure tend to disclose more environmental information, since the supervisory 
board represent an effective mechanism for protecting environmental matters.  
This paper has several implications. Firstly, this research shows that the institutional 
contexts where firms operate are determinants of the disclosure of environmental information. 
Particularly, our evidence reports that companies located in LME countries and in developed 
countries are more likely to disclose environmental information. The scarce regulation toward 
environmental issues in LME countries and, the economic development in developed 
countries may support the fact that companies in these types of countries are more engaged 
with environmental issues by reporting environmental information. Thus, firms operating in 
countries with strong regulation on environmental practices and low economic development 
should think about extending their business to LME and developed countries if these 
companies are sensitive toward environmental issues. Secondly, our results show that the type 
of board structures (one-tier or two-tier boards) is a factor to take into account when 
environmental disclosure is addressed. One-tier or two-tier board structures depend on the 
legal system of each country and firms with a two-tier board system tend to report more 
environmental information. Thus, stakeholders located in countries where two-tier board 
structures prevail will be more likely to receive environmental information and, therefore, 
there is a high probability that their needs and interests are satisfied. Thirdly, this paper may 
be of interest for regulatory bodies because our findings report that stricter regulations about 
environmental practices not necessarily result in better environmental actions such as the 
disclosure of environmental information. Maybe it would be more relevant that policymakers 
take actions in line with becoming aware firms, managers and other business actors on the 
relevance of reporting environmental issues. Fourthly, researchers should extend our research 
exploring the effect of other characteristics of different institutional contexts on 
environmental disclosure. Race, religion or gender diversity are demographic factors, which 
depend on the institutional context and, thereby, they merit our attention.  
	
	
The findings of this study should be interpreted in light of certain limitations. It is 
possible that there are unknown factors that could affect our dependent variable, which it is 
possible that we have disregarded.  
The authors observe some opportunities for future research. Firstly, scholars may 
extend the results of this study by exploring the factors impacting the quality of 
environmental information disclosed by listed firms. Secondly, it would be interesting to 
analyse if the existence of a sustainability committee could encourage firms to engage in 
socially responsible actions. 
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Number of observations by country 
  
Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia 816 6.229 6.229 
Austria 41 0.313 6.542 
Belgium 97 0.740 7.282 
Bermuda 15 0.115 7.397 
Brazil 257 1.962 9.359 
Canada 1,155 8.817 18.176 
Chile 106 0.809 18.985 
China 335 2.557 21.542 
Czech Republic 8 0.061 21.603 
Denmark 112 0.855 22.458 
Egypt 22 0.168 22.626 
Finland 142 1.084 23.710 
France 575 4.389 28.099 
Germany 405 3.092 31.191 
Greece 10 0.076 31.267 
Hong Kong 126 0.962 32.229 
India 170 1.298 33.527 
Ireland; 174 1.328 34.855 
Isle of Man 1 0.008 34.863 
Israel 6 0.046 34.908 
Italy 132 1.008 35.916 
Japan 1,766 13.481 49.397 
Jersey 20 0.153 49.550 
Luxembourg 65 0.496 50.046 
	
	
Macau 5 0.038 50.084 
Mexico 122 0.931 51.015 
Netherlan 220 1.679 52.695 
New Zealand 53 0.405 53.099 
Norway 70 0.534 53.634 
Papua New 7 0.053 53.687 
Portugal 29 0.221 53.908 
Russia 190 1.450 55.359 
South Africa 80 0.611 55.969 
Spain 207 1.580 57.550 
Sweden 259 1.977 59.527 
Switzerland 389 2.969 62.496 
Thailand 97 0.740 63.237 
United Kingdom 1,204 9.191 72.427 
United States 3,612 27.573 100 








Number of observations by activity sector 
TRBC economic sector name Number of observations 
Percentage Cum. 
Basic Materials 1,845 14.084 14.084 
Consumer cyclical. 2,469 18.847 32.931 
Consumer Non-Cyclical 1,293 9.870 42.802 
Energy 1,310 10.000 52.802 
Healthcare 1,016 7.756 60.557 
Industrial 2,795 21.336 81.893 
Technology 1,022 7.802 89.695 
Telecommunications Services 518 3.954 93.649 
Utilities 832 6.351 100 






ED_ SCORE The aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if 
the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise. 
LME Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market 
economy and 0 if the country operates in a coordinated market economy 
DEVEP Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 
0 if the firm operates in a developing country 
BOARD_STRUCTURE Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier board and 0 if the 
company has a two-tier board 
INDEP_MEMBERS The ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the 
total number of directors on boards 
BSIZE The total number of directors on boards  
	
	
BMEET The numbers of meetings held by boards each year 
CEODUALITY Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as 
CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise 
SIZE The log of total sales  
ROA Operate income before interests and taxes over total assets 
LEV Debt over total assets 
CSR_COMMT Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social 
Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise 
BASIC MATERIALS Dummy variable: 1=  Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise  
CONSUMER CYCLICALS Dummy variable: 1=  Consumer Cyclicals; 0 = Otherwise  
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICALS Dummy variable: 1=  Consumer Non-Cyclicals; 0 = Otherwise  
ENERGY Dummy variable: 1= Energy; 0 = Otherwise  
HEALTHCARE Dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise  
INDUSTRIALS Dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise  
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise  
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES Dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise  








Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 p50 P75 
ED_ SCORE 13,100 12.872 9.308 4.000 12.000 21.000 
LME 13,100 89.129 38.129 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DEVEP 13,100 89.205 31.032 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BOARD_STRUCTURE 13,100 71.845 44.977 0.000 1.000 1.000 
INDEP_MEMBERS 13,100 63.325 26.381 46.667 70.000 85.714 
BSIZE 13,100 10.905 3.561 9.000 10.000 13.000 
BMEET 13,100 9.421 5.247 6.000 8.000 11.000 
CEODUALITY 13,100 29.926 45.795 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 13,100 9.643 1.479 9.394 9.806 10.241 
ROA 13,100 6.439 8.446 2.764 5.575 9.584 
LEV 13,100 12.900 217.720 2.661 5.723 10.779 
CSR_COMMT 13,100 58.905 49.202 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BASIC MATERIALS 13,100 14.085 34.788 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER 
CYCLICALS 13,100 18.848 39.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICALS 13,100 9.870 29.828 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ENERGY 13,100 10.000 30.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HEALTHCARE 13,100 7.756 26.749 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INDUSTRIALS 13,100 21.337 40.971 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TECHNOLOGY 13,100 7.802 26.821 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 13,100 3.955 19.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UTILITIES 13,100 6.344 24.376 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean. standard deviation and percentiles. ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the 
value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country 
operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy 
	
	
variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0 if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE 
is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; 
INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards; 
BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings held by boards each year; CEODUALITY is the 
Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the 
log of total sales; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMM Tis the 
Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if 
the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer 
Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, 
otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare 
sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company 
operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
ED_SCORE (1) 1.000 
                    
LME  (2) 0.062 *** 1.000 
                   
DEVEP  (3) 0.063*** 0.696*** 1.000 
                  
BOARD_STRUCTURE  (4) -0.185*** 0.011 0.013 1.000 
                 
INDEP_MEMBERS  (5) -0.022** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.387*** 1.000 
                
BSIZE  (6) 0.313*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.055*** -0.077*** 1.000 
               
BMEET (7) 0.080*** -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.160*** -0.112*** -0.085*** 1.000 
              
CEODUALITY  (8) 0.017* 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.170*** 0.192*** 0.091*** -0.105*** 1.000 
             
SIZE  (9) 0.505*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.112*** 0.041*** 0.501*** 0.046*** 0.133*** 1.000 
            
ROA  (10) -0.134*** -0.098*** -0.099*** 0.210*** 0.093*** -0.085*** -0.233*** 0.023*** -0.199*** 1.000 
           
LEV  (11) 0.141*** -0.000 0.003 -0.076*** -0.013 0.174*** 0.092*** 0.024*** 0.285** -0.379*** 1.000 
          
CSR_COMMT  (12) 0.616*** 0.051*** 0.053*** -0.069*** 0.011 0.184*** 0.111*** -0.029*** 0.289*** -0.131*** 0.102*** 1.000 
         
BASIC MATERIALS  (13) 0.053*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.046*** 0.000 -0.064*** 0.013 -0.087*** -0.061*** -0.074*** -0.047*** 0.085*** 1.000 
        
CONSUMER CYCLICALS  (14) -0.053*** 0.079*** 0.078** 0.041*** -0.066*** -0.015* -0.105*** 0.011 -0.083*** 0.030*** -0.033*** -0.049*** -0.195*** 1.000 
       
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS  (15) 0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 0.034*** -0.036*** 0.063*** -0.020** 0.003 0.006 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.033*** -0.134*** -0.159*** 1.000 
      
ENERGY  (16) -0.059*** -0.123*** -0.124*** 0.087*** 0.076** -0.0169 0.010 0.012 0.093*** 0.043*** -0.097*** 0.001 -0.135*** -0.161*** -0.110*** 1.000 
     
HEALTHCARE  (17) -0.064*** 0.057*** 0.057*** -0.003 0.087** -0.074*** -0.016** 0.024*** -0.075*** 0.087*** -0.091*** -0.046*** -0.117*** -0.139*** -0.096*** -0.097*** 1.000 
    
INDUSTRIALS  (18) 0.019** 0.071*** 0.070*** -0.119*** -0.075*** 0.038*** 0.022** 0.013 0.002 -0.081*** 0.131*** -0.011 -0.117*** -0.139*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.043*** 1.000 
   
TECHNOLOGY  (19) 0.013 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.026*** 0.052**** -0.079**** 0.006 0.023 -0.065*** 0.103 -0.219*** -0.056*** -0.118*** -0.140*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.084**** -0.152*** 1.000 
 
  
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES  (20)	-0.014 -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.008 -0.024** 0.073*** 0.090*** -0.012 0.105*** -0.009 0.113*** -0.013 -0.082*** -0.098*** -0.067**** -0.068*** -0.059 -0.106*** -0.059*** 
 
  






Correlation matrix. ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable 
equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed 
country and 0 if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; 
INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards; BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings 
held by boards each year; CEODUALITY is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total sales; ROA is operate 
income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMMT is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; 
BASIC MATERIALS if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS 
if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates 




Multivariate analysis results 
 












DEVEP  4.001*** 
(0.000) 
 












































































































ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the 
firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country 
operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0 
if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier 
board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the 
total number of directors on boards; BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings held by boards each year; 
CEODUALITY is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; 
SIZE is the log of total sales; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMMT is 
the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if the 
company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 
0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the 
company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS 
if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company 





Estimates of the baseline models lagging the independent variables 
 

















































































































ED_ SCORE is calculated as the aggregation of the 54 items considered. Each item will take the value 1 if the item considered is disclosed by the 
firm and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market economy and 0 if the country 
operates in a coordinated market economy; DEVEP is calculated as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firm operates in a developed country and 0 
if the firm operates in a emerging country; BOARD_STRUCTURE is determined as Dummy variable equals value 1 if the company has a one-tier 
board and 0 if the company has a two-tier board; INDEP_MEMBERS is the ratio between the total number of independent directors on boards and the 
total number of directors on boards; BSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; BMEET is the numbers of meetings held by boards each year; 
CEODUALITY is the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; 
SIZE is the log of total sales; ROA is operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; CSR_COMMT is 
the Dummy variable equals value 1 if the firms have a Corporate Social Responsibility Committees and 0, otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if the 
company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 
0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the 
company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS 
if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company 
operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01 
